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CASE NOTE
STATE JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE
INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
WATER LAW-STATE COURT JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL
RESERVED RIGHTS-In allowing state courts to adjudicate fed-
erally-held Indian water rights, the Supreme Court finds no distinc-
tion between Winters Doctrine rights and other federal reserved
rights. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
and Akin v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
About 1857, during the period of American exploration of the
Southwest, army lieutenant Joseph Christmas Ives was leading an
expedition to ascertain the limits of navigation on the lower Colo-
rado River. In his report, Ives observed that "the region is ... of
course, altogether valueless. It can be approached only from the
South, and after entering it there is nothing to do but leave. Ours has
been the first, and will doubtless be the last, party of whites to visit
this profitless locality."'
While Ives' opinion of the Grand Canyon region has been well
refuted by the scores of visitors who journey annually to marvel at
its surrealistic beauty, the sense of emptiness and barren remoteness
that Ives felt still pervades many areas of the western United States.
This is due principally to the role of water, which has always been at
a premium in the West. Its presence, or lack of the same, not only
shapes the landscape, but limits the areas of habitation and the
growth rate of the population. Consequently, water use and control
are becoming an increasingly important legal and political issue.
This struggle over water is especially pronounced in those states
where large amounts of land are owned by Indian tribes. The unfore-
seen demand for western energy production, much of it being satis-
fied by Indian-owned reserves, has the potential of creating water
shortages that may give rise to bitter water rights conflicts. Current
energy development has already led to an increase in water costs, and
projected increases in energy production will no doubt drive costs
higher. A recent federally financed study of energy development in
the western United States recognizes this potential problem:
Unquantified federal and Indian rights might ... create some
rather significant water availability problems. In large part this is
1. L. FREEMAN, THE COLORADO RIVER 169 (1923).
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because of the reservation or Winters Doctrine which provides that
each time the federal government sets aside land from the public
domain for a federal purpose, including Indian reservations, it im-
plies a reservation of water resources to meet the needs of that
land....
Under the reservation doctrine, Indian tribes potentially control
large quantities of water in the West. Since most Indian lands were
set aside in the nineteenth century, Indian water rights are some-
times referred to as "prior and paramount." . . . [M] any of the sur-
face sources of water for energy development flow through or
border reservations. If Indians are ultimately found to hold prior and
paramount rights, existing allocations and appropriations among and
within western states could be seriously affected. .
In this context arose the case of Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District v. United States and Akin v. United States,3 its com-
panion case. The decision is already well over a year old, yet debate
continues as to the meaning behind the case and the impact it will
ultimately have on western water litigation.
Akin, as the two cases will be referred to here, presents the impor-
tant question of which court, state or federal, has power to adjudi-
cate Indian water rights, known as Winters Doctrine rights. Water was
originally acquired by the federal government as part and parcel of
lands ceded to it or obtained by conquest. Although much of this
land has subsequently been transferred to the states, the right of the
federal government to reserve water rights sufficient to service the
land retained was settled long ago and has not been seriously ques-
tioned in recent years. As early as 1899 the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company4 that
there were strict limitations on a state's power to appropriate the
water on land ceded to it by the federal government. The Court
stated that "in the absence of specific authority from Congress a
state cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United States,
as owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its
waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of
the government's property."'
Winters rights were first recognized in 1908 in Winters v. United
States.6 Unlike most water rights, Winters rights are federal rather
than state in origin, having been implied in treaties, statutes, or exec-
2. Environmental Protection Agency, III Energy from the West: A Progress Report of a
Technology Assessment of Western Energy Resource Development 998 & 1000 (1977).
3. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
4. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
5. Id. at 703.
6. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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utive orders granting lands to Indian tribes. The recognition of the
Winters Doctrine provided the basis for later judicial decisions
acknowledging other "types" of federal reserved rights. In Arizona v.
California,7 the Supreme Court for the first time held that the
United States could retain water in streams or other sources for the
benefit of national forests, monuments, or parks. And although the
precise extent and nature of reserved rights has yet to be determined,
it is clear that they are not created in accordance with state law.
Therefore they have been held to have a priority date as of the time
the particular reservation or enclave was created, regardless of the
state requirements of diversion and beneficial use. These rights con-
tinue to exist whether used or not, with the amount of the right to
be determined by the purpose of the federal reservation. All federal
reserved rights have been judicially created, but only the Winters
Doctrine rights have been given an expansive and liberal construction
by the courts.8
Akin arose when the United States, seeking adjudication of various
reserved water rights in the San Juan River and its tributaries in
Colorado, instituted suit in United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado against numerous water users. This area is included
in Colorado's Water Division Seven. Under Colorado's Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act,9 the state is divided into
seven divisions, each encompassing one or more drainage basins of
the larger rivers in the state. Adjudication of water claims in the
divisions is carried on continuously,' 0 with referees ruling on appli-
cations or referring them to a water judge.' ' Engineers in each divi-
sion are responsible for the distribution of water in accordance with
the decisions of the referees or judges.' 2
Soon after the federal suit was initiated, one of the defendants
filed an application in state court in Water District Seven, seeking to
make the United States a party to state proceedings in the division
for the purpose of adjudicating the same water rights which were at
issue in the federal suit. The United States was served pursuant to 43
U.S.C. § 666, commonly referred to as the McCarran Amend-
ment, ' 3 and several of the defendants in the federal proceeding
moved the district court to dismiss on the grounds that the McCarran
7. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
8. See Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights
to the Use of Water, 3 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1975).
9. COLO REV. STAT. § § 37-92-101 etseq. (1974).
10. Id. at § § 37-92-302 to 37-92-303.
11. Id. at § 37-92-303.
12. Id. at § 37-92-301.
13. See note 16, infra.
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Amendment left that court without jurisdiction to hear the case. The
district court granted dismissal on the basis of abstention. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed,
holding that the federal suit was appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
§ 134514 and that the doctrine of abstention was not properly
applied.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the McCarran Amendment had withdrawn the jurisdiction
of federal courts to adjudicate reserved water rights and whether the
district court's dismissal was appropriate. In a 6-3 decision, the Court
held that state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction, i.e.,
the McCarran Amendment did not abolish existing federal jurisdic-
tion to hear water cases initiated under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. Nonethe-
less, the dismissal of the suit by the district court was appropriate,
although for reasons other than abstention.
The interpretation of the McCarran Amendment,' 6 passed by
Congress in 1952, is the focus of the controversy in the Akin case.
According to the Senate Report accompanying the bill, which closely
follows the actual wording of the law, the purpose of the legislation
was to
permit the joinder of the United States as a party defendant in any
suit for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of any river
system or other source or for the administration of such rights where
it appears that the United States is the owner or is in the process of
14. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced
by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized
to sue by Act of Congress."
15. 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
16. The McCarran Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970), as codified,
provides in full text:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appro-
priation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and that the
United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a
party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead
that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: PROVIDED, That no judgment for costs shall be
entered against the United States in any such suit.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the
United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United
States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any interstate
stream.
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acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law, by purchase,
exchange, or otherwise, and that the United States is a necessary
party to such suit. 1 7
Congress sought to achieve this goal by a waiver of the United States'
sovereign immunity to suit when comprehensive adjudication of
water rights is involved. This means that the United States can be
served and joined in any general adjudication suit in state or federal
court.' ' Initially, only federal water rights obtained under state law
were presumed to be included in the scope of § 666, but United
States v. District Court In And For Eagle County, 9 and United
States v. Water District No. 5,20 held that the McCarran Amendment
applied to federal reserved rights as well-except those that benefited
Indians. 2'
In finding that state courts have jurisdiction over Indian Winters
Doctrine rights under § 666, the majority in Akin relied on the
decision in Eagle County and Water District No. 5. In so doing, the
Court stated that:
Though Eagle County and Water District No. 5 did not involve re-
served rights on Indian reservations, viewing the government's trus-
teeship of Indian rights as ownership, the logic of these cases clearly
extends to such lands. Indeed, Eagle County spoke of non-Indian
and Indian rights without any suggestion that there was a distinction
between them for purposes of the amendment.22
By relying on what can only be described as dicta in these earlier
cases, the Court in Akin bypassed any serious discussion of the actual
origin and nature of Winters rights and their relationship to other
reserved rights. Yet, as is clearly documented in earlier judicial deci-
sions and policies, Winters Doctrine rights are qualitatively different
from reserved rights held for other purposes. The significant differ-
ences include, first, the fact that water rights set aside for Indian
tribes, unlike other reserved rights, are held in trust by the federal
government. This distinction was discussed in the final report of the
National Water Commission, entitled Water Policies for the Future.
17. S. REP. NO. 755, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
18. Rank v. Dugan, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), held the McCarran Amendment applicable only
to general adjudications, as distinguished from suits to determine only specified or limited
rights.
19. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
20. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
21. The Court in these cases did not address the question of the application of the
McCarran Amendment to Indian rights. It found that other federal rights were intended to
be included in the scope of the Amendment where the United States was "otherwise" the
owner of water.
22. Supra note 3, at 810.
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Indian water rights are different from federal reserved rights for such
lands as national parks and national forests,'in that the United States
is not the owner of the Indian rights but is a trustee for the benefit
of the Indians. While the United States may sell, lease, quit claim,
release, or otherwise convey its own federal reserved water rights, its
powers and duties regarding Indian water rights are constrained by
its fiduciary duty to the Indian tribes who are beneficiaries of the
trust.
2 3
The scope of this federal trust responsibility has been discussed in
many cases. 24 It has been said that "[u]nder a humane and self-
imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress
and numerous decisions of this Court, [the United States] has
charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust. Its conduct ... should therefore be judged by the most exact-
ing fiduciary standards." 2 1 The .Court in Akin seemingly failed to
consider the duty that this relationship imposed on Congress in en-
acting the McCarran Amendment and on the courts in reviewing and
construing it.
The problem that the Amendment creates lies with the detrimen-
tal effect that state adjudications may have on Indian water rights.
With the recent spurt in western growth and the increasing demand
for exportation of western energy, states are becoming increasingly
jealous of their control over water.2 6 But with the reserved rights
doctrine firmly embedded in the law, the next best thing to state
ownership is complete state jurisdiction over and adjudication of
water rights. With state governments and citizenry anxious over
feared loss of precious water to Indian tribes, what some have termed
the "Indian scare theory of jurisprudence," it is only reasonable to
question the neutrality of state courts in water adjudications. After
having fought for years to deny Indians water rights, states are now
asked to determine and protect these same rights. In recent hearings
on Indian water problems, Senator Edward Kennedy stressed this
need for fair and uniform water adjudications.
Indian water rights-no matter how critical to a tribe's future, no
matter how well inventoried, no matter how brilliantly defended by
government attorneys, cannot receive full protection in state court
23. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 477
(1973).
24. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1941); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886); United
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1934).
25. Seminole Nation v. United States, supra note 24, at 296-97.
26. Supra note 2, at 997.
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forums, for the security of Indian water rights rests not only upon a
full commitment from the Executive and the complete support of
Congress, but also upon the availability of an independent and dis-
passionate federal judiciary to adjudicate these rights. The Akin case
may make this impossible. 27
There are many statutes and court cases emphasizing the need to
protect important federal interests from the biases of state courts 2 8
whose elected judges are more subject to political pressure than
judges sitting in federal courts. Given the importance to Indian tribes
of a fair and even generous interpretation of their water rights, the
Court should have found that delegation of jurisdiction to state
courts was a violation of the trust responsibility of Congress. Author-
ity to support this position stems from the long-held tenet that
statutory constructions are to be resolved liberally on behalf of In-
dian Tribes. 2 9 Such a rule obviously draws support from the trust
responsibility owed by all branches of government-including the
courts.
To the objection that continued federal jurisdiction of Indian
reserved rights would be too confusing and burdensome on the dis-
trict courts, it seems obvious that this burden would be no more so
than would be imposed on state courts, especially with the use of a
federal water master. It would not be necessary to join all holders of
rights on a given stream in a federal suit. As has been correctly
pointed out, only the Indian claims need be settled in federal court,
perhaps making the state a class-action defendant. The resulting
determination could then be incorporated into the findings of a state
adjudication.3" This would allow for uniformity of construction of
Indian rights, avoiding the potential of different interpretations by
courts of some fifteen western states. In addition, such a method
would more fully assure unbiased fact finding. The Akin opinion
states that since Indian water rights present a federal question review-
able by the Supreme Court, there should be no problems of state
adjudications "imperil[ing] those rights."'" But since the most
important purpose of any trial court is the fact-finding process and
since factual determinations of trial courts are rarely disturbed on
appeal, the Court's rationale appears lacking in substance. The fact of
historical federal guardianship of Indian interest should have raised
27. Indian Water Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 2 (1976).
28. Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
29. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1972); United States v. Hibner,
27 F.2d 909 (E.D. Idaho 1928).
30. Supra note 27, at 6 (Statement of Peter R. Taft).
31. Supra note 3, at 812.
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some presumption in favor of continued federal protection, absent
express Congressional intent to terminate it.
A second difference between federal reserved rights and Winters
rights is that the Indian rights are private in nature, only being held
in trust by the United States, whereas other federal reserved rights
are public rights. This has significant implication for the United
States, both as trustee of the private Indian rights, and as holder of
the public rights-especially when the two conflict. As was pointed
out in recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure, the government has a much higher
responsibility toward Winters rights than other federal reserved
rights.
Just as a private trustee, the United States has a duty of undivided
loyalty, which has been called the most fundamental duty owed to
the beneficiary by his trustee or a ward by his guardian. Another
important duty is the obligation to preserve and protect the trust
property, which includes taking all reasonable steps to enforce the
beneficiary's legal claims relating to the property. And just as a
conflict between the private trustee's fiduciary duty of loyalty and
his own personal interests would be intolerable if it interfered with
performance of his trust responsibility, a conflict between the rights
of Indian beneficiaries and the public purposes embodied in federal
programs with adverse interests must not impede the effective dis-
charge of the United States' fiduciary obligation to protect private
Indian property rights.
The conflict . . . is not one which properly can be resolved
through the process of balancing conflicting interests. Such a balan-
cing procedure ... is desirable where competing public policies are
being balanced; this of course, is the method by which public policy
is formulated. But private rights, which the United States is obli-
gated as a fiduciary to defend, cannot be so balanced against con-
flicting public purposes. The government's relationship to the
Indians is, in this respect, unique in character. 32
This emphasis on the importance of judicial review and enforce-
ment of the trust responsibility is well founded.3 I States and their
voters, wary of the assertion of Indian interests, are beginning to take
a narrower view of such rights. A case in point is the recent recom-
mendation by the Western Conference of the Council of State Gov-
ernments to prohibit Indians from voting in state elections unless
32. 1! Federal Protection of Indian Resources; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 236
(1971) (Paper presented by Reid Peyton Chambers).
33. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1215 (1975).
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they surrender jurisdiction over their lands and persons to the
states." The courts must respond to this backlash by reviewing
governmental actions in light of their strict responsibility to protect
and preserve Indian rights.
Implied in the nature of Winters rights and the fact that they are
held in trust for Indians is a third major difference. This is that
Winters reserved rights, unlike other reserved rights, are meant to
concretely benefit a people, rather than land. They provide a means
of livelihood and sustenance for those living on reservations. As the
Court states in Arizona v. California:
It can be said without overstatement that when the Indians were put
on these reservations they were not considered to be located in the
most desirable area of the nation. It is impossible to believe that
when Congress created the great Colorado River Indian Reservation
and when the Executive Department of this nation created the other
reservations they were unaware that most of the lands were of the
desert kind-hot, scorching sands-and that water from the river
would be essential to the life of the Indian people and to the animals
they hunted and the crops they raised ... (emphasis added). 3 s
Finally, because the Winters Doctrine benefits a people, it has
been construed more broadly than other reserved rights. This is evi-
dent from the amounts of water that have been allocated to the two
types of federal rights. To date the Winters right has been held to
allow sufficient water to supply all "practicably irrigable acreage" on
a reservation, even should such acreage require water far in excess of
the average irrigated land in a state.3 6 Contrariwise, other federal
reserved rights have been held to minimal allotments. In Cappaert v.
United States3 7 involving water reserved for a national monument,
the Court stated that:
the level of the pool may be permitted to drop to the extent that the
drop does not impair the scientific value of the pool as the natural
habitat of the species sought to be preserved. The District Court thus
tailored its injunction, very appropriately, to the minimal need, cur-
tailing pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an adequate
water level at Devil's Hole ... (emphasis added).38
The deciding point in Akin, however, was the weight given to the
policy of the McCarran Amendment. Legislative history shows that
34. The New Mexican (Santa Fe), Sept. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
35. Supra note 8, at 598-99.
36. Id. at 600.
37. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
38. Id. at 141.
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the statute was enacted to aid in the unified adjudication of water
rights in river systems in the various states.' I The majority felt that
Colorado's "all-inclusive statute" provided such a comprehensive
adjudication and that to allow reserved rights held by the federal
government on behalf of Indian tribes to elude jurisdiction would
vitiate the amendment's purpose.4 Considered in vacuo this reason-
ing is doubtless sound. However, there are other long-recognized
principles of law which, when included in the weight of the delibera-
tions, might have counseled a different outcome.
One is the strong countervailing policy of allowing Indian tribes to
be free of state jurisdiction except in specific and limited situations.
This policy, as recounted earlier, stems from the long-standing power
struggle between tribes and states-the states' jealousy of Indian
tribal sovereignty and the often vehement opposition of tribes to
state jurisdiction over their persons and property. Tribal immunity
from state jurisdiction has of course been recognized in case law as
far back as Worcester v. Georgia,4 ' and as recently as Bryan v. Itasca
County4" and Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County.4 3 Why
the Court did not at least address the relationship of this long-
standing and oft-relied on policy against state court jurisdiction is
not clear, especially in light of those cases which hold that congres-
sional approval of state jurisdiction over Indians must be specific and
explicit.
The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate Indian
territory as separate from that of the states and provide that, for the
most part, all intercourse with Indians shall be carried on and regu-
lated exclusively by the federal government. It is clear that state laws
cannot, without express congressional consent, adversely affect real
property rights of Indian tribes.4 ' As water carries with it the type
of vested rights associated with real property, it seems that states'
power to affect water rights should be subject to the same restric-
tions. As a dependent sovereign people Indians have traditionally
been subject only to the jurisdiction of the federal government, ex-
cept in those specific and limited situations where Congress delegates
its authority or declares otherwise. The Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that "the policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction
39. Supra note 17, at 5.
40. Supra note 3, at 811.
41. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
42. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
43. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975).
44. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
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and control is deeply rooted in the nation's history."'4  How it could
have found Indian rights to be included in the innocuous wording of
the Amendment as encompassing rights obtained "otherwise" by the
government is, without more elaboration, incomprehensible.
Although the Court specifically held that the McCarran Amend-
ment provides for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, the exag-
gerated weight given to the policy of the amendment as endorsing
comprehensive adjudications may well have the practical effect of
withdrawing federal jurisdiction.4 6 The affirmance of the district
court's dismissal will no doubt supply precedent for state attorneys in
future cases, although until Akin almost all adjudications affecting
federal rights were filed in federal rather than state courts-even after
passage of the McCarran Amendment.4" In addition, the Court's
allusion to the fact that the state adjudication should take preference
because "the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may
exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts" 4 8 will
undoubtedly be latched onto by states as confirmation of their
adjudication procedures as continuous, ongoing procedures. This
could allow them to defeat earlier filings for federal adjudication,
although many western states have very irregular adjudications, years
and miles apart in time and continuity.
McCARRAN AND PUBLIC LAW 280
Another incongruous aspect of the decision in Akin is the Court's
interpretation of the McCarran Amendment in light of the policy
enunciated in what is commonly referred to as Public Law 280. The
majority found that the McCarran Amendment was a "specific stat-
ute" that granted state jurisdiction to adjudicate tribal water rights,
even though such jurisdiction was never mentioned in the amend-
ment, while it found Public Law 280, which specifically excluded
water rights from its otherwise broad grant of jurisdiction to the
states, to be of a general nature and therefore not controlling.4" The
effect of such an interpretation is better understood if prefaced with
a short explanation of Public Law 280.
Congress originally passed P.L. 83-280, 25 U.S.C. § § 1321 et seq.
(1970) in 1953, being purportedly the most general and unprece-
45. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra note 29, at 168, quoting Rice v. Olson,
324 U.S. 786, 791 (1945).
46. Supra note 27, at 5 (Statement of Peter R. Taft).
47. See New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 45 L.W.
3564 (1977); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956).
48. Supra note 3, at 818. But see dissent of Justice Stewart, at 822 & 823.
49. Supra note 3, at 812 n. 20.
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dented surrender of federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs ever
undertaken. Section 1322(b), which is known as the "savings
clause," limits the states as follows: first, nothing in Public Law 280
allows for the "alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or
personal property, including water rights..." belonging to any
Indian or Indian tribe; second, Public Law 280 does not confer upon
the states subject matter jurisdiction of such property or any interest
therein.' 0
Recent federal cases that have considered the application of Public
Law 280 in two of the six states originally covered by the Act,
California and Minnesota, have construed the delegation of authority
narrowly against the states. In Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings
County' ' the court held invalid a county zoning ordinance affecting
Indian trust lands on the grounds that such an ordinance was not a
state law of general application and constituted an "encumbrance"
proscribed by the statute. Santa Rosa was cited with approval in
Bryan v. Itasca County," 2 wherein the United States Supreme Court
held invalid the application of a state personal property tax on In-
dian lands held in trust by the United States. There, the Court denied
one Public Law 280 state's bid to exercise broad regulatory power
through its tax laws. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan indicated
that states would not be heard to argue that consent by the federal
government pursuant to Section 1322(a), in light of the listed excep-
tions in 1322(b), meant that exercise of state regulatory power was
impliedly authorized. While Congress provided that states might
obtain civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country, it laid
down strict procedural requirements, e.g., disclaimer provisions in
state constitutions or statutes are to be modified and, after 1968,
tribal consent is required. Further, the delegation by Congress to the
states was not broad, but limited in nature and was designed to cover
only criminal actions and civil causes arising within Indian country.
Thus Colorado, a state free from the impediment of a constitu-
tional disclaimer provision, would be allowed to extend its state civil
and criminal jurisdiction into the state's only two reservations, the
Southern Ute and the Ute Mountain Ute, if tribal consent were to be
obtained from the two tribal governments. Colorado would not,
however, be able to exercise its administrative and regulatory powers
over Indian water rights, despite its recent victory before the United
States Supreme Court in Akin. Such an exercise of broad regulatory
50. In 1968 Public Law 280 was amended to require that the consent of affected tribes
be obtained before the exercise of state jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970).
51. Supra note 43.
52. Supra note 42.
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power would be inconsistent with the express limitations of 25
U.S.C. § 1322(b). "Nothing in this section shall authorize the
... encumbrance.., of any real or personal property, including
water rights ... (emphasis added)."
A final objection to the decision is found in the Court's review of
the legislative history of the McCarran Amendment. "Participants for
the Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior," the
Court said, "made clear that the proposal would include water rights
reserved on behalf of Indians."' 3 Both appeared in opposition to the
Amendment, yet it is a general rule of statutory construction that
the testimony of opponents of legislation is not credible evidence of
statutory intent.' ' There appears to be no other reference in the
legislative history that the inclusion of Indian or federal reserved
rights was contemplated.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that in arriving at its decision the Court had to reach far
to support its findings of state jurisdiction. Justice Stewart, writing a
dissent with which Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred, recog-
nized this ruse:
The Court says that the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado clearly had jurisdiction over this lawsuit. I agree.
The Court further says that the McCarran Amendment "in no way
diminished" the District Court's jurisdiction. I agree. The Court also
says that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to
exercise the jurisdiction given them." I agree. And finally, the Court
says that nothing in the abstention doctrine "in any of its forms"
justified the District Court's dismissal of the government's com-
plaint. I agree. These views would seem to lead inevitably to the
conclusion that the District Court was wrong in dismissing the com-
plaint.5 s
But with the decision in Akin apparently inscribed in the law
books, our primary concern should be to determine the logic behind
the opinion, to test its conclusiveness on various issues, and thereby
to determine its overall affect on federal Indian water rights in the
West. While doing this an overriding consideration to keep in mind is
the general tightening up of district court jurisdiction that is being
affected by the present Court, and the role that this action may have
had on the decision.
53. Supra note 3, at 813.
54. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
55. Supra note 3, at 821.
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For all its rationalization, the Court's opinion leaves many un-
addressed questions, primary among these is the effect the decision
will have in future years. In its narrowest interpretation, it is appli-
cable only to the facts as they appear in the case. Such a narrow
reading is unlikely, but the Court made clear that variation in any of
several factors could counsel a different outcome. 16 Of these the
most important is Colorado's "all-inclusive" adjudication system. If a
less comprehensive system were involved the Court could not rely so
heavily on unity and continuity of adjudication as demanding federal
presence in the state court. In this respect it is important to note that
Colorado is one of only a few western states that does not have an
enabling statute or constitutional provision disclaiming jurisdiction
over Indian lands. The presence of such a disclaimer may restrict
courts in other states, although its importance has been discounted in
some decisions.' 7
Most important for the future of western water litigation is the
question of whether the opinion in Akin may be said to exclude the
possibility of the tribes filing adjudication suits in federal courts,
rather than the United States doing so as their trustee. This particular
point was not addressed in the opinion, and many feel it to be quite
tenuous; but it seems likely that such a suit should necessarily be
allowed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 s 8 district courts are given original
jurisdiction of civil actions that are brought by recognized tribes and
that involve questions of federal law. Because the Court acknowl-
edges reserved rights involve a federal question,' 9 district court juris-
diction seems quite compelling. The McCarran Amendment refers to
joinder in state suits of "the United States where it appears that the
United States is the owner or is in the process of acquiring water
rights.... "6 0 It can be seriously argued that this wording does not
grant state court jurisdiction over the tribes themselves, especially in
light of the historical immunity of tribes from state control. 6 ' And
given this immunity, the argument of the majority in Akin that
another forum exists for such cases would lose much of its force.
Similar principles have been recognized by many courts, most
56. Id. at 820.
57. New Mexico v. Lewis, 88 N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976).
58. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970) provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought
by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
59. Supra note 3, at 813, quoting United States v. District Court In and for Eagle
County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
60. Supra note 14.
61. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra note 26.
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recently the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeils. In. New Mexico v.
Aamodt,6 2 a case involving water rights of Pueblo Indians, the court
stated that "[t] he obligation of the United States to fulfill its fidu-
ciary duties to the Pueblos does not diminish the rights of the Pueb-
los to sue on their own behalf."'6 3 As tribes become increasingly
independent and develop their own legal talent, it is likely that they
will institute more of their own legal actions. Though some close
observers of the Akin case think that such tribal independence and
sovereignty will not soon be recognized by the federal courts, much
will depend on the position taken by the state courts in water
adjudications involving Indians, which in turn may depend on the
attitudes and opinions of the state's voters toward Indian claims.
JEFF TAYLOR and DUANE BIRDBEAR
62. 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 L.W. 3564 (1977).
63. Id. at 1107.
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